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Abstract 
The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis (Katsos & Smith, 2010) 
was originated to explain the difference between children and 
adults concerning scalar implicatures. They introduced the 
use of a Likert-scale to test this hypothesis.  We conducted a 
study with a within subjects design in which we compare 
children‟s binary and scalar responses to the same 
underinformative sentences. We also used two separate tasks 
to look at the effects of task difficulty on performance. The 
results show that the more difficult task, Euler circles, lead to 
less pragmatic responses compared to the easier task, 
drawings. Confirming the study by Katsos and Smith (2010; 
see also Katsos & Bishop, 2011) children choose the middle 
options on the scale more when they are confronted with 
underinformative sentences and they choose more extreme 
options for the control sentences. The comparison with the 
binary responses however, reveal that the link between the 
two measuring methods is not as straight forward as we 
would think.   
Keywords: Scalar Implicatures; underinformative sentences; 
children; scalar responses pragmatic tolerance. 
Introduction 
Communication is not always as straightforward as one 
might think. In 1989 Grice published his work on the 
cooperative principle that was meant to explain how our 
human interaction can be described. The cooperative 
principle expects a person to interact in a way that furthers 
the purpose of the conversation and indicates that a second 
person expects the first person to do so. The cooperative 
principle allows for implicatures to be used. When a person 
uses an implicature, the meaning of what that person says is 
not explicitly communicated, but can nonetheless be derived 
from what he says. The utterance is under-informative, more 
information could have been given but has not. For example 
when a wife asks her husband whether he‟ll be home for 
supper, and the husband answers that he has a meeting that 
will run late that day, then the husband is using an 
implicature. His wife will not expect him for dinner. One 
can assume that she accepts the meeting running late will be 
the reason, or at least a possible reason, that the husband 
will not be present at dinner. Nevertheless it is still possible 
that the husband will appear for dinner, for the implicature 
is cancellable. It is possible that the husband just meant he 
would be a little late for dinner, still he would not have lied 
in his earlier utterance.  
One specific form of implicatures are scalar implicatures, 
which we will focus on in this paper. As the name implies, 
scalar implicatures consist of words that can be situated on a 
scale, known as Horn scales (see Horn, 1984). These words 
range from less informative to more informative, for 
example a scale containing words like <none>, <some> and 
<all>. Each word further on the scale contains more 
elements of a group. When a speaker uses a certain less 
informative word in an utterance, it is implicated that the 
more informative word is not applicable. When a person 
uses the word „some‟, the word „all‟ would not be 
appropriate. It is considered a mutual understanding 
between speaker and recipient that the speaker would have 
used the more informative word if it were suitable. 
Nevertheless he deliberately chose to use the less 
informative word on the scale therefore the more 
informative is not suitable. For example when the prime 
minister says  „Some banks are collapsing due to the 
financial crisis‟, a citizen can assume that „not all‟ banks are 
collapsing due to this crisis, for the expression of „some‟ 
implicates „not all‟. The citizen presumes that the prime 
minister would have said „All banks are collapsing due to 
the financial crisis‟ is this were the case. If a few months 
later the prime minister makes the announcement „All the 
banks have collapsed due to the financial crisis‟, this would 
not be a withdrawal of his earlier statement. Specific to 
implicatures is that they are cancellable in only one 
direction. When a speaker uses the weaker term „some‟, it 
can later be easily corrected to „all‟. Yet when a speaker 
initially uses the stronger term „all‟, it is not possible to 
change it to „some‟ later on. At least not without admitting 
one was erroneous the first time. The stronger term „all‟ 
entails the weaker term „some‟ but not vice versa.  
When a speaker uses the word „some‟ in an utterance, 
there are two different ways to interpret this weak scalar 
term. The first way is the pragmatic way that was described 
above. A recipient might produce a scalar implicature and 
assume that the speaker meant „some and not all‟ with the 
statement. Yet another way of interpreting the word „some‟ 
is a purely explicit logical interpretation. The explicit 
meaning of the word „some‟ is „at least one and possibly 
all‟. Both interpretation of the word are equally correct and 
it is the choice of the recipient on how he will interpret it. 
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 Further in this article, we will refer to scalar implicatures as 
underinformative items or sentences. 
We already know from different studies that children and 
adults interpret underinformative sentences in alternative 
ways. Noveck (2001) argues that a weak scalar term is 
understood in its explicit meaning first and will appear first 
in human development. Only later on the more complex 
pragmatic meaning will be incorporated. This argument is 
clearly demonstrated by the results of Noveck‟s study 
(2001). He found how children of 7-8 years old and 10-11 
years old have acceptance rates of 89% and 85% for 
sentences that are logically true but pragmatically 
infelicitous. Adults on the other hand, accept these 
sentences in only 41% of the cases. This clearly 
demonstrated how for children the pragmatic meaning of 
these sentences is not incorporated. While for adults these 
pragmatic meanings are fully incorporated and are used as 
the principal criteria to accept or reject sentences.  
The results also show how these differences between 
children and adults cannot be explained by the children‟s 
limited understanding of words like „some‟ and „all‟. For all 
the different utterances that do not hold a conflict between 
the logical and the pragmatic meaning, the answering 
patterns of children and adults are very alike. The reason for 
the discrepancy between children and adults is not entirely 
clear. Noveck explains this by the posterior development of 
the pragmatic understanding of underinformative sentences. 
The processing of the pragmatic meaning of 
underinformative sentences is also cognitively much more 
demanding than the processing of the logical meaning (De 
Neys & Schaeken, 2007). Because of this, the pragmatic 
interpretation is harder to incorporate for children. Another 
factor that contributes to this is the nature of the task.  
Pouscoulous et al. (2007) reported experiments in which 
they changed the nature of the task from verbal judgments 
to action-based judgments. Using small boxes that contained 
tokens, participants were asked to alter the setting of the 
tokens to match a statement. They were also allowed to 
leave a setting as it was. Within the experimental design, 
children‟s performance on producing implicatures was 
much higher than in experiments with verbal judgments. 
This increased implicature production was found for all ages 
(4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds as well as adults). Still, the 
developmental effect was present. These experiments show 
how the understanding of implicatures can be facilitated in 
young children by changing task features.  Other studies 
have also showed how changing task features can facilitate 
children‟s performance (Guasti et al., 2005; Papafragou & 
Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004) 
Katsos and Smith (2010) did research on 
underinformative sentences in children and adults. They 
raised the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis to explain for 
differences between children and adults as well as 
differences between adults. The starting point of this 
hypotheses is that there are different degrees of violations. 
Several violations can lie within an utterance yet not every 
violation is equally grave. Participants can and will reject 
utterances that are a grave violation of the logical truth. Yet 
they might accept or reject an utterance that only holds a 
violation of informativeness and thus is an infringement of 
the cooperative principle. There is no implicit rule on how 
to deal with pragmatically infelicitous utterances. The 
threshold of what is and what is not acceptable is individual 
for each person and is called pragmatic tolerance by Katsos 
and Smith (2010).   
An obvious way to test this hypothesis was adopted by 
Katsos and Smith (2011, also see Katsos and Bishop (2011) 
and Katsos et al (2011)).  Katsos and Smith (2010) 
introduced the use of a Likert scale to the research on 
underinformative sentences. A Likert scale is a bipolar 
psychometric scale on which a participant can indicate to 
what extend he agrees or disagrees with a certain statement. 
Katsos and Bishop (2011) made their participants indicate 
how much they agreed with utterances containing the words 
„some‟ and „all‟. Both children and adults clearly rejected 
utterances that were inherently false and accepted utterances 
that had an optimal use of the words „some‟ and „all‟. 
Interestingly, for the underinformative utterances, the 
answering patterns for children and adults were also very 
similar, as both groups chose the middle option on a 3-point 
Likert scale. This is in strong contrast with Noveck (2001) 
were the answering patterns for children and adults were 
much more distinct, notwithstanding the children in this 
study were older. Katsos and Smith (2011) explain this with 
the pragmatic tolerance principle. Children appear to be 
competent pragmatic comprehenders. They do sense the 
pragmatic violation when underinformative sentences are 
used. Yet due to their different tolerance levels, they do not 
experience this violation to be grave enough to be rejected. 
Therefore, when they are confronted with a two alternatives 
forced choice, they will not reject the violation while adults 
will. 
In this paper, we want to explore these results more 
thoroughly and make three hypotheses. First of all, we will 
vary the task method. Pouscoulous et al. (2007)  and others 
taught us that the nature of the task is of great importance. 
We expect that when we use different tasks, we will be able 
to make children reason more or less pragmatic, depending 
on the task difficulty. We will apply different methods than 
those used in Katsos and Bishop (2011) and Katsos and 
Smith (2010). Earlier research on underinformative 
sentences used different methods than the current ones. For 
example Newstead (1989, 1995) used Euler circles in his 
research. This abstract testing method should be difficult for 
children and thus induce more logical reasoning. We also 
developed a more child-friendly method using drawings 
which should induce more pragmatic reasoning in children. 
Our second hypothesis concerns pragmatic tolerance. It 
seems obvious that this theory should be examined with a 
within subjects design in which children are confronted with 
a Likert scale as well as with the two alternative forced 
choice paradigm. We expand the testing method used in 
Katsos and Bishop (2011). Participants will be confronted 
with each underinformative sentence twice, once with the 
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 option of responding on a Likert scale or once with a two 
alternative forced choice. With this research we expect to 
replicate Katsos and Bishops (2011) findings, namely that 
children do seem to detect a conflict when they are 
confronted with underinformative sentences. We expect that 
this conflict detection will be hidden when confronted with 
a two alternative forced choice but will become clear when 
they are confronted with the Likert scale. We will use 
children around the age of eleven, congruent with Noveck 
(2001). According to this study we expect children of this 
age to be still much more logical than adults. 
Finally, we will look at consistency in children‟s answers. 
We expect that children that answer logically or 
pragmatically with the scalar measuring method, will 
answer in the same direction with the two alternative forced 
choice measuring method.  
Method 
Twenty-two Dutch speaking children participated in this 
research (mean age 11,3 range 11-13).  
The children received a pen and paper test. The test 
started with a cover-up story about a boy named Thomas. 
The children were told that Thomas was new in class and 
came from a foreign country. They were told he was still 
learning the Dutch language and the children were to 
indicate how precise his answers were. Children had to 
indicate their answers either by indicating right or wrong, or 
on a 5-point Likert scale. The ends of the Likert scale were 
illustrated with a happy smiley and a frowning smiley. On 
the scale, the children were to indicate how well they 
thought that the boy‟s answer was, going from completely 
wrong to completely right. They were also allowed to use 
the middle options when the answer was only a little right or 
wrong or evenly right and wrong. 
Two different tests were used. Both tests had the same 
basic structure. We started each trial with a given situation. 
This situation was presented either by a figure or a drawing. 
Then the participants were given a statement about the 
situation. They were instructed to indicate how well the 
statement described the situation given above.  
First was the Euler circles task. The circles for each figure 
were either completely overlapping, partially overlapping or 
completely disconnected. Each circle represented a group of 
blocks, for example „red blocks‟, „square blocks‟, which 
was written inside each circle. The participants received a 
statement about the blocks and had to judge how precise the 
statement described the circles setting. For an example of 
this, see Figure 1. 
For the second task, we used a method which was more 
adapted to children, Drawings. For the given situation, the 
children were now shown a drawing of a real life setting, for 
example a few kids playing with a bow and arrows. Again 
the children had to judge a statement about the setting, e.g. 
„Some arrows are shot in the bull‟s-eye‟. Due to the more 
authentic stimuli, the task became much easier for children.  
 
Figure 1: Example of Euler circles, drawings, scalar 
response option and binary response option. 
Results 
We inverted all scores of the logically false items. This way, 
high scores on the control items, for both logically false 
items and optimal items, indicate competent reasoning. We 
also inverted answers on the underinformative items. 
Because of this, the maximal score of five points is an 
extreme pragmatic answer and the minimal score of one is 
an extreme logical answer. Finally we converted the binary 
zero and one scores to one and five scores to make them 
comparable with the scalar responses. 
For the control items we found very high average scores, 
4.72 (.20) for binary responses and 4.56(.34) for scalar 
responses. This means that the children understand the 
words „some‟, „all‟ and „none‟ adequately. For the 
underinformative items, we found average scores of 
3.93(.89) for the binary responses and 3.16(.98) for the 
scalar responses. For more detailed results, see Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Mean ratings and standard error of the mean for 
Euler circles (EC) and Drawings (D) 
 
 
We ran a repeated measures design with three within 
factors with two levels each, namely measuring method, 
task and item type. We found three main effects. The two 
measuring methods levels, binary answers versus scalar 
answers, are significantly different from each other (F(1,21) 
=9.46, p<.01). Binary responses are higher than scalar 
responses, as expected because binary responses only allow 
extreme answers. For the two tasks, Euler Circles seem to 
 Binary Scalar 
EC – Control items 4.60 (.36) 4.46 (.36) 
D – Control items 4.92 (.18) 4.65 (.41) 
EC – Underinformative items 3.18 (1.51) 2.65 (1.05) 
D – Underinformative items 4.70 (.57) 3.71 (1.11) 
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 be more difficult and lead to more logical answers than 
Drawings, F(1,21) =54.07, p<.00.  For the item types, 
control items versus underinformative items, children 
answer more extreme for control items and more varied for 
underinformative items, F(1,21) =54.72, p<.00. We found 
two interaction effects. The interaction between measuring 
method and task was not significant but the other two 
interaction effects were, measuring method versus item 
(F(1,21) =4.63, p<.04; see Figure 2) and task versus item 
(F(1,21) =21.62, p<.00; see Figure 3). The three-way 
interaction was not significant.  
Figure 2: Interaction between measuring method and item 
type. 
 
We calculated the difference between the control items 
and the underinformative items for each measuring method. 
A paired-samples t-test on these values was significant 
(t(21)=2.21, p<.04). This means that the interaction between 
measuring method and item type is explained by a 
difference in size of the effect of measuring method on item 
type.  
The main effect of task and its interaction with item, 
mean that the Euler Circles were more difficult, especially 
for the underinformative items and thus lead to more logical 
answers. To confirm this, we calculated the difference 
between the control items and underinformative items for 
each task and analyzed with a paired t-test, t(21)=4.65, 
p<.00.  
For the control items, 84% of the items were answered 
with an extreme answer of one or five on the scale . For the 
underinformative items, only 47% were answered with an 
extreme one or five. These two percentages were 
significantly different from each other (t(21)=5.22, p<.00). 
Finally we look at consistency of answers. We interpret 
being consistent between the two methods when a child 
gives an extreme answer of one or five on the scale and 
gives the equal binary response for the same item. For the 
control items, the children were fairly consistent between 
the two measuring methods. 80% of the children can be 
considered consistent under this rule. For the 
underinformative sentences, children were much less 
consistent, only 33 % of them was consistent in their 
answers between the two methods. When we adopt a more 
flexible rule including also the two and four answers on the 
scale, which would also be acceptable, 87% and 57% of 
children can be considered consistent.  For the 
underinformative items, 16% of the time the middle option 
of the scale was chosen.  
Figure 3: Interaction between task and item type. 
Discussion 
In this study we examined three hypotheses. First of all, we 
expected that children‟s performance will depend on the 
task difficulty. More precisely, we expected the Euler 
circles to be more difficult than the Drawings task and to 
lead towards less pragmatic answers for the 
underinformative items. Next we expected to replicate 
Katsos and Bishops (2011) findings, namely that children 
answer extremely pragmatic or logical when confronted 
with control items but more doubtful when confronted with 
underinformative items and a scale. Finally we expected 
children to be consistent in their answers on the two 
different measuring methods. 
For the first hypothesis, we can find confirmation in the 
main effects of task and the interaction between task and 
item type. The Euler Circles task is clearly more difficult 
than the Drawings task. For the control items this difference 
is small but significant. For the underinformative items, this 
difference becomes even larger. For the more difficult task, 
the Euler circles, this leads to more logical answers. For the 
easier task, the Drawings, children become more pragmatic. 
There still remains a significant difference with the control 
items though. We hereby can confirm what Pouscoulous et 
al. and others made us expect. Task features can influence 
children‟s pragmatic reasoning on underinformative 
sentences. We noted earlier that we expect task difficulty to 
be the determining factor here. Yet we acknowledge that 
another factor may be at work as well. The Euler Circles 
task is believed to rely on logical reasoning skills. It might 
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 be possible that the logical interpretation is triggered by the 
general logical characteristics of the task. In this case, not 
task difficulty but the logical nature of the task would be the 
determining factor. More in depth research on the matter 
seems necessary. The tasks used in this study were also very 
adapted to usage with children. More grammatical 
approaches to the material might lead to different 
conclusions. If the grammatical view of scalar implicatures 
(e.g. Chierchia, 2006; Fox, 2007) is correct, then in 
principle the implicature-computing operator could also be 
inserted in embedded positions, thus giving rise to 
embedded scalar implicatures. Chierchia, Fox and Spector 
(de twee papers) argue that an implicature-computing 
operator can indeed be inserted in embedded positions. It 
would be interesting to see how our conclusions and those 
of Katsos and Smith (2010) and Katsos and Bishop (2011) 
could be incorporated into this grammatical approach.  
Secondly, we found a significant effect of measuring 
method and an interaction with item type. The difference 
between binary answers and scalar answers for the control 
items is significant. But the difference between the methods 
becomes much larger for the underinformative items. This 
confirms our hypothesis and replicates Katsos and Bishop 
(2011). When confronted with a scale, children do feel that 
there is a conflict between the pragmatic and the logical 
interpretation of underinformative sentences. They tend to 
choose the middle options of the scale more often (53%) 
than when confronted with control items (16%). This rules 
out the possibility that children are just unfamiliar with the 
use of scales. They are adequate in using scales and it is a 
deliberate action to choose the middle options for the 
underinformative items and the more extreme options for 
the control items. This confirms the pragmatic tolerance 
hypothesis  in that children use the scale to express that they 
feel the conflict between the logical and the pragmatic 
interpretation.  
We do however find a difference with common literature. 
The children in this study seem to be much more pragmatic 
than reports from other studies, especially with the binary 
responses. One explanation for this is probably the 
children‟s ages.  Much research on this topic used younger 
children than the ones used in this study. It is self-evident 
that the slightly older children used in this study would 
perform more pragmatically and adult-like. Moreover, the 
current study was conducted in Dutch. Previous unpublished 
research on underinformative sentences with Dutch 
speaking children, revealed that these children are more 
pragmatic than their English-speaking (Katsos and Bishop, 
2011) or French-speaking (Noveck, 2001) counterparts. 
Dutch speaking children seem to be more comparable to 
Spanish speaking children for example. In a study by Katsos 
et al. (2011), Spanish-speaking children rejected 
pragmatically false underinformative statements in 87% of 
the cases. It seems that the Dutch word „sommige‟ is not the 
exact equal of the English word „some‟. This will probably 
contribute to the high rate of pragmatic answers in Dutch-
speaking children.  
Finally we examined consistency. These results seem to 
differentiate from the earlier found results. The children 
were not very consistent in their answers. Especially for the 
underinformative items, children were consistent in only 
57% of the cases and 16% they chose the middle option. 
This still leaves 27% of the cases where children were not 
consistent. This percentage seems rather high to us and it 
interferes with the pragmatic tolerance theory. In roughly 
one fourth of the times, children‟s binary responses and 
their responses on the scale are not related. On top of that 
and in contrast to the study by Katsos and Smith (2010), we 
found much larger variances for both the control items and 
the  underinformative items. This all suggests that the link 
between binary answers and scalar answers is not a direct 
link. For control items and underinformative items, up to 
19% of the answers were cases in which the children gave 
an exact opposite to answer the binary items and the scalar 
items. We can hypothesize that in these cases children just 
made a simple error and that this wasn‟t intentional or due 
to a lack of understanding. But there is no way to be sure of 
this and it is in contrast with high overall levels of 
performance.  
In conclusion, our study mainly confirms the pragmatic 
tolerance hypothesis but it also questions some aspects of it. 
It is clear to us that the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis and 
the relationship between binary and scalar answers on 
underinformative sentences is not as straightforward and 
that more thorough research on the matter is necessary.  
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